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Barry A. Krisberg, Hubert G. Locke,
Michael L Radelet, and Susan Welch
This article is reprintedfrom Summary, Volume 1
of the Assessment of the Status of African-Ameri-
cans series, published in 1990 by the William Monroe
Trotter Institute, University ofMassachusetts at Bos-
ton, and edited by Wornie L. Reed. Materials in-
cluded in the article were adaptedfrom papers sub-
mitted by members oftheAssessment ofthe Status of
African-Americans Study Group on Political Partici-
pation and the Administration of Justice.
The status of African Americans in relationship
to the administration of justice has improved since
the 1940s. Significantly, however, researchers con-
tinue to find racial discrimination and racial disad-
vantage operating in various aspects of the criminal
justice process in numerous jurisdictions. Such find-
ings are unacceptable in a society that claims to
honor equal justice under law.
Historically, the law, the police, the courts, and
the prisons have been used as instruments of oppres-
sion and subordination based on race. When the Su-
preme Court in its Brown decision 1 articulated for
the first time in constitutional history that black
Americans had a right to equal protection of the law,
it began the process of repudiating those historically
oppressive instruments and began the process of
reconciling black Americans to the institutions of
criminal justice. The Furman decision, 2 which out-
lawed the arbitrary and discriminatory use of the
death penalty, and the Coker decision, 3 which out-
lawed the use of the death penalty in rape cases (over
90% of those executed for this crime were black
men), were moves in the right direction, but dis-
crimination and disadvantage based on race con-
tinued to be found in this and other important as-
pects of criminal justice processing.
If the nation is to complete the process of recon-
ciliation in this area, if it is to win the trust of black
Americans in its police, courts, and correctional pol-
icies, it must move to eliminate all vestiges of racial
bias from the administration of justice. To aid in
that process, scholars composing the study group on
the administration of justice have closely examined
the existing literature, made assessments of con-
temporary practices, and produced an evaluation of
criminal justice that identifies those areas where dis-
crimination abounds.
Capital Punishment
One of the areas of concern is the unequal appli-
cation of the death penalty. Between 1930 and 1967,
3,586 people were executed. Over half of those ex-
ecuted for murder and 92% of those executed for
rape were black Americans. Some scholars attribute
the 1972 Furman decision in part to this overwhel-
mingly disproportionate use of capital punishment.
The informal moratorium on executions that began
in 1967 continued for another five years after the
Furman decision abolished the death penalty as it
was being imposed, because of its arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application. That moratorium ended in
1977 after the Supreme Court ruled in Gregg* and
four companion cases that capital punishment was
constitutional under certain circumstances.
In the decade between 1977 and 1987, black
Americans continued to represent a higher propor-
tion of those executed than the proportion of black
citizens in the population. Of the 70 persons put to
death during those years, 24 were black Americans
(34.3%), 42 were white Americans (60%), and 4
were Hispanic (5.7%). Of the 1,901 persons on death
row in 1987, 50.4% were white Americans, 41.4%
were African Americans, 5.8% were Hispanics, and
1.4% were native Americans. In spite of all the ef-
forts to make the death penalty statutes more fair
during the last fifteen years, the minority popula-
tion on death row has been reduced by less than 1%.
In capital punishment cases the variable exerting
the strongest predictive power in correlation with
sentencing is the race of the victim. After controlling
for 230 variables, a massive statistical study done in
the McCleskey v. Kemp case5 demonstrated that de-
fendants charged with killing whites are 4.3 times as
likely to receive the death penalty as defendants
charged with killing blacks. Black defendants
charged with killing whites are sentenced to death
seven times more often than whites who kill blacks.
Studies on the use of the death penalty since Gregg
indicate that racial disparities in capital sentencing
remain. Black defendants convicted of killing whites
are more likely to receive the death penalty than any
others convicted of capital crimes.
In spite of all the efforts to make the death
penalty statutes morefair during the lastfifteen
years, the minority population on death row has
been reduced by less than 1%.
In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) the Supreme Court
considered a petition to overturn a death penalty
conviction in Georgia. The petition was supported
by a massive statistical study using sophisticated
statistical analysis. The study demonstrated that in
Georgia the race of the defendant and the race of the
victim were critical variables in the decision to exe-
cute. The court in its ruling acknowledged that that
disparity was proven in the imposition of the death
penalty. The justices further acknowleged that this
disparity reflected racial bias against black defen-
dants. Nevertheless the court in a five-to-four deci-
sion ruled:
[S]uch discrepancies do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In order to prevail under that Clause, a
criminal defendant (unlike an employment dis-
crimination plaintiff, for example) must prove
that decisionmakers in this case acted with dis-
criminatory purpose. 6
Reminiscent of Plessy's 1896 legal justification of
segregation, 7 the McCleskey ruling provides a legal
justification for the discriminatory application of
the death penalty. Execution is the most extreme
form of punishment our nation imposes on its citi-
zens. Giving legal sanction to discrimination in the
application of the death sentence makes a mockery
of the ideal of equal justice under law, and it moves
the country backwards to the pre-1967 era when
capital punishment was systematic manifestation of
racial oppression.
Sentencing
Research on sentencing in categories other than
capital punishment indicates that racial discrimina-
tion varies widely across the United States. Despite
disagreements over the reasons and the significance
of the findings, researchers agree that black criminal
defendants receive more severe sentences than do
white defendants. While there should be concern
that studies of disparity in sentencing have arrived at
different conclusions on the issue of racial bias, such
an outcome is expected given the highly decentral-
ized and localized structure of the American judi-
ciary with regard to criminal matters. It should come
as no surprise that blacks are discriminated against
in some jurisdictions but not in others. Most dis-
crimination is found in the South, but not exclu-
sively so. Aggregate studies do not separate men and
women in evaluating outcomes, and this distorts the
findings because female defendants are treated less
severely by the courts than are males. Still, reputable
studies like the Michigan Felony Sentencing Project8
and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion Study9 provide evidence that race continues to
be a consistent factor in criminal sentencing. These
studies have been used to fashion new judicial policy
nationally as well as in other states.
A number of conclusions are evident. Black males
are more likely than white males to be sentenced to
prison. Whites receive the probation option more
often than blacks in similar circumstances. The race
of the victim is important to understanding how dis-
crimination gets involved in sentencing. And there
tends to be more discrimination in the less formal
aspects of the adjudication procedures, including
plea-bargaining, than in the more formal and open
trial process. This last observation is especially note-
worthy because over 90% of all cases in most juris-
dictions do not go to trial. Plea-bargaining is the
process by which most criminal cases are disposed
of. That most discrimination is found in these less
formal aspects of criminal justice processing should
be the cause of considerable concern. Most ot the
work in the administration of justice is done in the
less formal, invisible adjudication processes, away
from public scrutiny.
Criminal Processing
Research on discrimination has focused primarily
on sentencing, but it now seems clear that race is a
significant factor in previous stages of the process.
These stages include police treatment of suspects
and arrests, prosecutors' decisions to file or dismiss
cases, and pretrial treatment of defendants, includ-
ing bail procedures. One study of a Houston court
found that prosecutors consistently failed to charge
whites with capital crimes against blacks even with
strong evidence. The reason given was that juries
simply would not convict a white person of a capital
offense against a black person. Rather than lose the
conviction entirely, prosecutors would charge white
defendants who had committed capital crimes
against black persons with a lesser offense. Thus ra-
cial bias as a factor in the final disposition of a crim-
inal case may be incorporated into a decision calcu-
lus at various stages of the process. The consequence
is the same. Contrary to legal theory, ideals about ju-
dicial process, and common standards of decency
and fairness, race oftentimes is a primary factor in
criminal processing.
Researchers such as Kleck 10 and Wilbanks 11 reject
the hypothesis that widespread and pervasive dis-
crimination exists against black people in sentenc-
ing. Their claims are questionable at best. Wilbanks
uses implication and speculation rather than empiri-
cal data to question the findings of racial effects.
Kleck uses an arbitrary classification scheme to ex-
clude from his analysis studies that found racial bias
in less than half of the offenses studied. Such intel-
lectual slights of hand should not be used as an ex-
cuse by policy makers to ignore this vital issue. Ra-
cial discrimination will not be found in every state or
every locality in the United States. Yet scholarly
studies continue to support the finding of racial bias
and disadvantage in various jurisdictions through-
out the country. When evidence of racial disadvan-
tage and discrimination is uncovered, policy makers
in criminal justice have a responsibility to eradicate
such bias. One of those areas is juvenile justice.
Juvenile Justice
Minority youth are incarcerated at rates three to
four times higher than white youth. The data on the
heavy involvement of minority youth in violent
crime cannot, by itself, explain such high rates of in-
carceration. Minority incarcerations in public cor-
rectional facilities increased 26% to 5,035 between
1977 and 1982. Black youngsters accounted for al-
most two-thirds of this increase. Concomitantly, the
number of white youth in public facilities decreased
by 7%. Earlier policies to remove minor offenders
from confinement mostly benefitted white youth. In
1982 incarceration rates per 100,000 by race and gen-
der were: 810 (black males); 183 (white males); 481
(Hispanic males); 98 (black females); 38 (white fe-
males); and 40 (Hispanic females).
The rates of minority incarceration continue to
grow at a faster rate than the confinement of white
youth. The data on minority youth crime are ambig-
uous and contradictory, and thus do not explain the
higher incarceration rates for minority youth. The
overrepresentation of minorities in arrest statistics is
not as large as the disproportionate number of mi-
nority youth who are incarcerated. Additionally, the
arrest statistics may overestimate the extent of mi-
nority involvement in serious youth crime because
black youth are more likely to be arrested and
charged with more serious crimes than whites en-
gaged in the same activities. The discrepancies be-
tween arrest statistics and incarceration rates have
led to concerns about discrimination within the ad-
judication phase of criminal processing for
juveniles.
Our evaluation of juvenile courts indicates that
minority and poor juveniles have been subjected to
widespread, systematic discrimination. Earlier re-
search efforts that focused on the final disposition
of the case, or on one decision point, ignored im-
portant discriminatory factors. The influence of
class, race, or gender may be most evident in initial
stages of the juvenile court process (detention deci-
sion or screening decision); but as a juvenile be-
comes increasingly enmeshed in the judicial system,
the impact of social characteristics is incorporated
into the newly defined process variables, decision
outcomes that inform subsequent decisions. Bias is
incorporated into initial legal decisions, and final
disposition, the most commonly examined decision,
is the last juncture and the point at which this trans-
formation is most likely to be complete.
Contrary to legal theory, ideals aboutjudicial
process, and common standards of decency and
fairness, race oftentimes is a primaryfactor in
criminal processing.
When juvenile court decision making is studied as
a multiphased process, the following conclusions
are evident. Black youths receive more severe dispo-
sitions than white youths. Black youths are much
more likely to be detained prior to a hearing and
somewhat more likely to be handled formally. As
with adults, this is significant since those detained as
well as those handled formally receive more severe
dispositions. Consequently, early juvenile court de-
cisions predispose black youths to more severe final
dispositions. One way racial bias operates in juvenile
courts is when social characteristics like race get
transformed into legal variables, and both sets of
factors act independently and together to affect the
treatment of black youths in the juvenile justice
system.
Recommendations
When the situation of black Americans in correc-
tional institutions is reviewed, what is immediately
evident is that the numbers of black Americans in-
carcerated in the country's prisons are immensely
disproportionate to their percentage in the general
U.S. population. Black Americans, together with
smaller percentages of Hispanics, Puerto Ricans,
and members of other racial minorities, currently
constitute the majority of American prisoners. 12 In
1982, black Americans accounted for approxi-
mately 12% of the U.S. population and 48% of the
prison population. 13 Black prisoners under the sen-
tence of death for capital offenses represent almost
one-half of all persons awaiting execution. 14 Per-
haps most alarming of all, black offenders represent
the highest percentages in prison populations in
those states where the percentage of black citizens in
the general population is low. 15
Sensible policy making requires an
acknowledgement of both the propensity ofsome
individuate to commit crime and the capacity of
society to encourage and abet criminality.
Although there are arguments over why such
gross disparities occur, the facts of disproportional-
ity are indisputable. The capacity of our analytic
tools may not be sufficient to discern the reasons,
yet we know what we need to know to cite the admin-
istration of justice and corrections as a high priority
for effective policy formulation. Sensible policy
making requires an acknowledgement of both the
propensity of some individuals to commit crime and
the capacity of society to encourage and abet crimi-
nality. Sober policies and programs are needed that
address both the individual and the societal dimen-
sions of the problem with equity and fairness.
The development of policy options needed to
eradicate racial bias in corrections, like those needed
in other criminal justice institutions, requires not
only a concern for eliminating discrimination, but
also a desire to improve the substantive performance
of these institutions in accomplishing the lofty
ideals of their mission. In corrections the policy
choices for most communities are simple: to con-
tinue to spend large sums of money to build prisons
and maintain corrections as a growth industry or to
spend roughly equal amounts of money to keep 40
to 60% of the incarcerated population out of prison
and engaged in socially productive lives. Criticisms
of racial bias made against the criminal justice proc-
ess are taken by some as evidence that black Ameri-
cans are "soft on crime." On the contrary, studies of
black attitudes on crime and the police reveal that
black citizens want fair, effective, "tough" law en-
forcement. What they do not want is to be presumed
to be criminal simply because they are black. When
considering the status of black Americans and the
administration of justice, the primary question is
not whether a uniform indictment or a clean bill of
health can be given to American justice with regard
to racial discrimination. The important question is
whether racial (or gender or status) discrimination is
acceptable in any jurisdiction, in any aspect of the
judicial process.
Amid national concern over drugs and violent
crime, the issue of racial bias in criminal proceed-
ings may not be considered a priority. However, the
respect for law necessary to reduce our crime prob-
lems is not possible if punishment is perceived to be
skewed by race. The system loses legitimacy if citi-
zens are punished or not punished because of their
color or the color of their victims, or because of
their education and income. Racial disadvantage
and discrimination are unacceptable in any system
of justice that strives both symbolically and sub-
stantively for fair and impartial treatment of those
accused and fair and effect punishment of those
found guilty.
A wide range of policy options are available to ad-
dress problems of bias when uncovered. These pol-
icy options include:
• Increased employment of black persons at all
levels of the criminal justice system;
• Bail reform when bail systems are used as pre-
ventive detention for the poor rather than to en-
sure appearance at trial;
• Upgrading the quality of defense counsel avail-
able to indigents with measures such as greater
privatization of indigent defense, higher pay,
and better working conditions of public defen-
der roles, which might include restructuring the
job;
• Establishment of prosecution standards along
with guidelines by which prosecutors are held
accountable where there is indication of the
abuse of prosecutorial discretion;
• Cultural sensitivity training for criminal justice
personnel, including judges;
• Guidelines on judicial conduct with respect to
discriminatory treatment added to those devel-
oped and monitored by judicial conduct com-
missions;
• Judicial recruitment that stimulated diversity
on the bench;
• Better training for judges and other criminal
justice personnel;
• Changes in legal education and professional
practices that encourage the development of
discriminatory attitudes and values; and
• Legal scholarship that challenges aspects of the
legal tradition that encourage racism.
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